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DOGIL4TISM AND SKEPTICISM IN LAW-
A REBUTTAL
THo-MAs M,. Qt-AYLE*
An article by Mr. Lee Loevinger which appeared in this Law
Review last spring,' expressed a philosophy of law that is contrary
to that held by this writer and many of his colleagues who are in the
practice of law. The philosophy of that article is felt to be the
underpinning of the materialistic forces that at this time comprise
the government of over a third of the world's people. The thoughts
of the article are those advanced so well by Justice 0. W. Holmes.
It is essentially the Godless law of force and power. The idea is that
right is the resultant of might. I was distressed at the article for
the reason that it was a direct intellectual attack upon the views
that I have held for many years. I have been educated to and now
believe in another concept of the nature of the relationship between
the governed and the government. However, inasmuch as the views
held by Loevinger are likewise held by a not inconsiderable portion
of mankind, I have felt it necessary to reexamine my position and
to reflect upon its validity. I have again read and studied the writ-
ings of the men who have expressed their considered views upon
the problem, and who are held by many of the learned of the earth
to have been men of learning and ability. And more than this, I have
devoted my capacity to reason. I have thought, analyzed, read and
listened to those who seemed to have an opinion on the matter.
From all this has proceeded my current opinion that the views
which I held prior to this latest effort are sound and supportable
in logic and reason; and conversely that the philosophy expressed
by Mr. Loevinger is incorrect and not supportable in reason or
logic. For if any statement be true, it is that the views held by
myself and those held by Loevinger are not compatible.
In the belief that many of my colleagues in the legal profession
agreed with my views, I prepared this article as a statement of
position in opposition to the materialistic skepticism advocated in
the article by Loevinger. I felt that it was necessary to do so be-
cause the physical agony of armed conflict among men is merely
the outward manifestation of the conflicting philosophies and ideas
which support each camp. In this time of the cold war, the ideology
that will attract and hold men should be sought for as a necessity
to survival from the slavery of body and mind that results from
*Member of the Minnesota Bar.
1. Loevinger, Dogmatism and Skepticislm in Law, 38 Minn. L. Rev.
191 (1954).
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an adoption of the tenets of the skeptical tyrants. The statement
that the truth will make you free was no truer when Chaucer wrote
than it is now.
It has been said that a generality is valid only insofar as the
particulars that support it are valid. An application of this idea
establishes the requirement that I specifically delineate and call
attention to the portions of the Loevinger article with which I dis-
agree. This in effect will be a sort of pleading in the cause.
The first portion that I call attention to is the part of the article
where the author refers to the natural attractions of the natural
law theory of legal philosophy. 2 To quote some of the pertinent
phraseology:
"Indeed, 'natural law' offers us a kind of legal heaven where-
in error will not exist and law, morality and justice will coincide
completely. Furthermore, once we have discovered any principle
of 'natural law' it will be the same for all men and for all time.
One of the characteristics of 'natural law' is that it remains the
same for all men everywhere. Thus the problem of uncertainty
in the law is eliminated by the simple expedient of making the
law certain and unchanging.
'3
Now, this statement and the one immediately preceding it in the
article convey an erroneous impression of the concept of the
natural law theory. The natural law is absolute and unchanging;
to say this is to state the truth, but it also must be borne in mind
that the law, as a concept, and its application to a specific problem
are two different ideas. A statute enacted by the Legislature of the
State of Minnesota is the law in the entire state, in the northern
counties as well as in the southern. The statute will read the same
as long as its words are there to read, no matter where it may be
found. It is the law of the state for as long as it remains unrepealed.
But we will find innumerable instances where the same statute has
been and will be applied differently in different situations. In one
case, before the district court in one county, the act will be applied;
and then in a fairly similar situation in another part of the state the
act will not be applied. This will be explained, and validly so, on the
ground that the fact situation is different in each case. Here is a
field similar to that of the application of the natural law. The law
as a concept is unchanging for all men at all times in all places, but
2. Here, in parentheses I suppose, I should state that the use of quota-
tions to surround the words "natural law" in the article is an unfair attempt
to belittle an entire school of thought. The use of these punctuation marks
is an apparent attempt to convey to the reader an idea that the author will
not express directly. I do not know what was meant, but feel that it is an
attempt to be cynical rather than skeptical.
3. Loevinger, supra note 1, at 199.
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it is the fact 'situation, the circumstances, the people, the situation in
particular that will cause an apparently different'result to be at-
tained in accord with the same natural law. Of course, there may
be error in the application of the natural law to a given situation.
There is no freedom from error in anything that is done by man,
and it is man that must apply the natural law principles to the facts
which he must discover. As Loevinger states, law, morality and
justice will coincide. What he does not explain is that the discovery
of law, morality and justice in a given particular situation must
still be the work of man and subject to all of the frailties associated
with the species. Indeed, the discovery of the fact situation in
which it is desirable to apply law, morality and justice is fraught
with error. As every lawyer knows, it requires an effort to dis-
cover the facts.
The next specific utterance that I wish to allege in issue here
is as follows:
"Thus it comes to this: that 'natural law' is anything which
one who asserts its existence intuitively apprehends, strongly
believes in or stoutly asserts."'4
This statement and the one preceding it in the article are just
as erroneous as the one we have just discussed. Now here is an
expression of the philosophy of the skeptic. It is the idea that if
a thing or an idea is, it is correct, right, just, fair and acceptable in
reason. Here is the acceptance of an idea because someone has said
that it is there. This is not the theory of the natural law. The true
student of the natural law does not believe that an absolute and
unchanging immutable principle will be adjustable to the intuition
of each man who professes a stand. The vigor with which a posi-
tion is asserted also has nothing to do with the validity in reason of
the principle. The number of times that a principle is asserted, the
number of people who assert it; the number of decibels of sound
with which it is asserted; the strength of the mechanical devices
that are used to spread the word; the permanence of the paper or
film on which a principle is recorded; all these have absolutely no
effect on the reasonable validity of the principle. All the tools of
modem and ancient propaganda may be used to spread further the
idea without affecting the truth one iota. Intuition is present as it
is in all thinking, and this intuition will tell a man thngs. Intuition
is conscience, it is training, it is the resultant of innumerable
stimuli that have been impressed upon and stored in the mind. It is
an inseparable part of reason, and as such, it plays some part in the
4. Id. at 203.
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attempt to apply the natural law to a given situation. Intuition,
however, is not the fundamental basis of the natural law. It is
rather a minor insignificant adjunct of the reason. Joe Goebbels
has espoused the other part of this statement and his reasoning
relative to the vigor of assertion has been adequately answered by
history. I only ask the reader to decide whether there is an effect
upon truth by the strength of the decibels used in assertion.
The next specific statement that I take into issue is in these
words:
"Thus 'natural law' offers its disciples not only the glory of
eternal and immutable superlatives, but also the repose of
knowledge acquired without investigation and certainty
achieved without private doubt or public debate. A proposition
offered as the conclusion of either an individual or a group is
always subject to questioning and refutation. But a proposition
offered as a principle of 'natural law' is, simply by definition of
the one who offers it, beyond questioning and immune to
refutation." 5
Again, if I may be permitted an observation, this statement is
not the correct position taken by the proponents of the natural
law. I for one certainly do not accept or adhere to the idea that
any legal or philosophical proposition is above debate or considera-
tion by the public. The public must be free to engage in debate
within the bounds of reason thus far established by the Supreme
Court in the field of Constitutional Law. I will always defend the
right of anyone to disagree, to argue, to state his position, to
examine the basis in reason and logic for an idea. The principles
of the natural law have been subjected to the scrutiny of the finest
minds that mankind has produced. Skeptics like Loevinger have
been at it for a long time, and others like the writer here have
spoken on the matter. Where is the lack of a public debate on the
matter? The publication of the papers by Loevinger and this writer
show the existence of public exposition of at least two separate
comments on the natural law.
As to private doubt, I can say that I have had private doubts;
I have often wondered about the manner in which I was applying
the principles of the natural law to a given situation. I have had
doubts that I was acting in conformance to the immutable principles
of the natural law. This did not for a moment mean to me that the
principles were not there, or that they were not absolute and un-
changing. The doubt was as to my intellectual capacity to under-
stand all the facets and ramifications of the situation to which I
5. Id. at 204.
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was about to apply the principle, and whether under the circum-
stances which confronted me the principle that I was applying
was the correct one.
To move on to other items of the pleadings, there is this state-
ment by Mr. Loevinger:
"The difficulty with the assurance that is offered by 'natural
law' theories is that even when all their assumptions are ac-
cepted there is no available methodology for ascertaining the
content of the universal principles from which such assurance
flows. . . .Whatever other function it may have, it is prac-
tically useless as a guide to decision and action in a mundane
system of civil law."6
Here is the cry for the justicestick, the demand for the tools.
Here is the voice of one crying that because there is disagreement
as to the application of the principle there is no principle. To him
I reply that he should search the history of the English law to find
the foundation of the law of negligence, "A reasonable man acts as
a reasonable and prudent man would under the same or similar
circumstances." Here is a principle of the civil law of negligence.
But courts have still not been able to tell how to find a reasonable
man. Does this mean that there are no general principles of the
law of negligence? Why should, a man come into Equity with
clean hands? Why should a trustee handle his trust as a prudent
man would handle his own funds? Why is there such a concept as
quantum meruit? Where is the fount of~these and other similar
ideas of the law? What do the Federal Rules mean when they
authorize the court to make such orders as justice may require in
several instances? Who can tell whether a man is or is not negligent
in a particular situation? Who can tell whether a man has clean
hands as he comes into Equity? Who can tell if a trustee acted as
did a prudent man with his own funds ? Whp, can tell whether there
has been unjust enrichment? Who is to test the justice of a court
order? It seems to the writer that the inception of all these legal
ideas came from an attempt to apply the principles of the natural
law to specific cases, and then the principle of stare decisis was
used to avoid any allegience to the real base. The natural law has
spawned a child, but the friends of the child were ashamed of the
parentage of it and so have substituted a fictitious father and
mother. Pound was correct when he stated that the number of
problems that required applications .of the natural law to their
solution was not large.7 It is of no concern to the natural law if
6. Id. at 204-205.
7. Pound, The Heated Judicial Dissent, 39 A. B. A. J. 794, 796 (1953).
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we drive on the right or on the left of the road; if the tax is levied
on a tonnage basis or ad valorem. The great majority of the daily
problems confronting the courts have no need for natural law
principles. But they are needed when the question before the court
involves moral issues, or when the question before the court in-
volves matters of ethics or religion. When the terms "substantial
justice" come into the court, then the principles of the natural law
must be, and generally are applied.
The next phase that I apply to these pleadings is the following
statement:
"The difficulty with such a situation is that the belief in
and search for absolutes blinds us to the facts of life."'
On the contrary, the belief in and search for absolutes intensi-
fies the effort to discover the facts of life, for if the principle is, as
I stated previously, absolute, immutable and forever static, then
the effort of the intellect need not be expended in a search for the
principle, and more effort can be delivered to the search for the
truth in *regard to the factual situation. Then the facts of life be-
come all important. The factual situation is the beclouded part
of the problem. What are the facts of life? What are the facts in
the particular situation that now confronts us? These are then the
all important problems. Because in the past, and even now, people
have been and now are mistaken as to certain facts does not mean
that this is because they bealieve in the absolute as a concept.
Loevinger states that motion is relative. This means that it is
relative to something, and that this something is the measuring
tool which is used to describe motion. But if the measuring tool is
not an absolute then the relativity means nothing. In the same
paragraph, he refers to "up" and "down" as being absolute con-
cepts. It seems clear to me that these terms are terms of direction
and as such are totally meaningless unless the measuring tool is
indicated. Here again is rel.ation. But we must always ask the
question; "Relative to what?"
Mr. Loevinger's reference to the cosmic wild goose chase ancT
the poll of the angels9 needs this answer. In Germany in the early
8. Loevinger, supra note 1, at 209.
9. "It is not enough for the absolutist philosopher that all of mankind
approve a law, he insists that we take a poll of the angels.4 [The best proof that something is desirable is the fact that some-
one desires it; and that it is socially desirable, the fact that most people
desire it.
".... [T]he belief in absolutes takes us on a cosmic wild goose chase and
prevents study and recognition of the observable facts of actual life." Id. at
210.
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part of this century, it was the accepted, desirable process for the
government to follow a policy of genocide with reference to the
Jews. There was also a concept of the super race of Nordic and
Aryan extraction that was corollary to this idea. Here were most
of the people who had anything to say "desiring" this type of
governmental effort. Here was human experience and human judg-
ment furthering a policy of extermination of a race because it was
national policy. This was spread by Goebbels as loud as could be
done. Measured against the human standards of the government at
the time and the place where the facts were occurring, the conduct
was acceptable and desirable. Measured against the immutable
principles of the natural law, those principles that recognize that
there is a relationship between responsibility and authority, between
control and answerability, measured against these principles, the
actions were wrong, unjust and incorrect in the moral and legal
order and he who obeyed did not obey the law for the law conflicted
with the governmental policy and decree.
Another idea of Loevinger's that I want to call to the attention
of lawyers is this. He states that there is little significance in ab-
stract theorizing and speculation in the law. I disagree completely
with this statement of idea. I think that the problems of the world
with regard to war, peace and government are the result of legal
speculation by philosophers. As I stated earlier, the fundamental
basis of much of our law is grounded initially on the attempt of
the early judges to find and apply the principles of the natural law
to a specific legal problem. A corollary might be drawn between
the law of trusts, for instance, and the way in which it has influ-
enced the actions of men for centuries; and the economic philoso-
phizing of Karl Marx, whose ideas have led to the enslavement of
over one-third of the world's people. I have purposely left until
the last the reference to totalitarianism that is mentioned in the
article of Loevinger. Here then is the statement:
"Yet the most totalitarian of contemporary governments is
firmly devoted to a 'natural law' ideology."10
Assuming that the reference is to Russia, I state that the first
edition of Marx's book bears little resemblance to Russia of today
as I understand it to be. I also have examined the Communist
Manifesto, which is closer to the ideology of the Russians than is
Marx's Capital. In the Manifesto there is a direct statement of the
connection between the capitalist state and the natural law concept.
This is the language of the Manifesto. written by Marx and Engels:
10. Id. at 202.
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"The selfish misconcep.tion that induces you to transform
into eternal laws- of nature and of reason the social forms
springing from your present mode of production and form of
property-historical relations that rise and disappear in the
progress of production-this misconception you share with
every ruling class that has preceded you.""
I ask the reader to peruse this and the other writings and
actions of the Soviets and to then decide whether the Russians are
firmly committed to the natural law philosophy. The answer must
be no. They are even more firmly addicted to the principles of the
expedient and the force philosopher than were Hitler and his ilk.
The test which they use is the strength of the opposing artillery.
Later in this article, I shall have occasion to refer again to the
writings of various writers of philosophy on the natural law.
However, this is an appropriate time to point up the difference be-
tween the attitude of the skeptics and that of the natural law people.
Let me direct the reader's attention to the work of Aquinas. He
states:
"I answer that, as stated above the precepts of the natural
law are to the practical reason what the first principles of demon-
strations are to the speculative reason; because both are self-
evident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two
ways: first, in itself; secondly, in relation to us. Any proposi-
tion is said to be self-evident in itself if its predicate is contained
in the notion of the subject, although to one who does not know
the definition of the subject it happens that such a proposition
is not self-evident. For instance, this proposition, Man is a
rational being, Is, in its very nature, self-evident, since who says
man, says a rational being; and yet to one who does not know
what a man is this proposition is not self-evident. Hence it is
that, as Boethius says, certain axioms or propositions are uni-
versally self-evident to all; and such are those propositions
whose terms are known to all, as, Every whole is greater than
its part, and, Things equal to one and the same are equal to
one another. But some propositions are self-evident only to
the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such
propositions: thus to one .who understands that an angel is not
a body, it is self evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in
a place; but this is not evident to the unlearned, for they can-
not grasp it.
Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are
apprehended by man. For that which, before anything else falls
under apprehension, is being, the understanding of which is
included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Therefore
the first indemonstrable principle is that the same thing cannot
be affirmed and denied'at the same time, which is based on the
11. Communist Manifesto, Chap. II.
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notion of being and not-being; and on this principle all others
are based, as is stated in the Metaphysics. Now as being is the
first thing that falls under the apprehension absolutely, so good
is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the prac-
tical reason, which is directed to action; for every agent acts
for an end, which has the aspect of good. Consequently the first
principle in the practical reason is one founded on the notion
of good, namely, that the good is what all desire. Hence this is
the first precept of law, that good is to be pursued and done,
and evil is, to be avoided. All other precepts of the natural law
are based upon this, so that whatever the practical reason
naturally apprehends as man's good belongs to the precepts of
the natural law as something to be done or avoided.
"Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil,
the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to
which man has a natural inclination are naturally apprehended
by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit,
and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. There-
fore the order of the precepts of the natural law is according to
the order of natural inclinations. Because in man there is first
of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which
he has in common with all substances; that is, every substance
seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature.
And by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of pre-
serving human life and of warding off its obstacles belongs to the
natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things
that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature
which he has in common with other animals. And in virtue of
this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural
law 'which nature has taught to all animals', such as sexual
intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there
is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his
reason, which nature is proper to him; thus man has a natural
inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society.
And in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination be-
longs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to
avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other
such things regarding the above inclination."' 2
Here then is one way to point up the controversy. Another
is to go to the problem that was used to indicate the necessity for
an examination into the moral basis for obedience to the law. The
question seems to be one involving the right of an individual to
refuse obedience to an apparently valid command. There are other
ways of phrasing the issue, here are some of them.
"Does an individual have a right to refuse obedience to a com-
mand of the state because to obey would violate his personal moral
code? Is it right to compel obedience to a command of the state
12. Summa Theologica, Part I of Second Part, Q. 94, Art. 2.
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which violates a personal moral code? Is it right or does the cor-
rect concept of justice require obedience to a command of the state
which violates a personal moral code?"
The answer of the skeptics to this issue is that no personal moral
code can be invoked validly when it conflicts with the moral code
of organized society as expressed in a duly enacted piece of legisla-
tion. They say that this is so because any moral tenet or belief
held by any individual may be in error; the tenets, the moral code
of the state or legislator may be in error also, but the individual
should yield to the command of the state because two heads are bet-
ter than one. Stated in other terms: all ideas are probably in error,
so in selecting the concept which most nearly represents the truth,
the idea of the legislator must be accepted because:
1. More people participate in formation of the idea.
2. More people support the idea.
3. The existence of government depends upon obedience to law.
4. For the benefit of all, each must surrender part of his indi-
dividual freedom.
5. Avoidance of a physical sanction follows obedience.
6. It is unjustifiable arrogance to say, "I am right, and the
whole of organized society, as represented by that law, is
wrong."
These are powerful arguments, and they are compelling. How-
ever, they can be refuted.
As it applies to a particular situation, a particular piece of
legislation is either just or unjust if those terms mean anything. In
the same situation, an individual's refusal to obey is either right or
wrong if those terms mean anything. To determine whether a
statute or other course of action of government is just or unjust in
a particular situation, or to discover whether an individual's action
is right or wrong in a particular situation, it is necessary that we
provide a standard of measurement against which we may lay the
situation to determine the answer. What is the measure of just and
unjust? From whence springs this standard? The skeptic says the
standard is within the law; from the fact of existence, from the
nature of promulgation, because of the reasons listed above, the
statute must be conclusively presumed just as against the contention
of any individual.
A thing cannot be a measure of itself. The terms, "measure",
"standard" and "conformance", imply an external, unchanging be-
ing into which an intellectual situation either fits or does not. To
(Vol. 39:273
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hold otherwise is to work in measurement with an elastic yardstick
causing the term "yard" to be meaningless and futile.
Where is the justicestick? Produce it and demonstrate its
validity, its existence and its form. Thus cries the skeptic.
The reader can understand how the universe and all that it
contains physically, intangibly, intellectually and known and un-
known to man has been and is created, ordered, set in motion and
controlled. Man possesses understanding, and his understanding
has enabled him to comprehend and use the surroundings in which
he is placed. He can and does use the elements of physical existence
to his advantage. These have been discovered by him from the use
of his reason and understanding. By his intellectual endeavor he has
derived knowledge of the rules of God in regard to gravity, friction,
and the interaction of the elements. These are the laws of nature.
Similarly, the Creator established an order among men. He set
down rules which govern the relationships between men. Conduct
among men toward each other follows a pattern, and is in accord
with and conforms to the rules of God just as certainly as the
elements are controlled in their relationships, with but one dis-
tinction. This distinction, this quality which distinguishes man
from the other items found in creation, in the respect which we now
consider is this: Man possesses a free will whereby he has been
given the power to choose whether he will, as an individual, con-
form to God's ordered plan for his relatio is with other men or
whether he will follow some other course of conduct.
The discovery of these rules by mankind, the discovery of the
natural law in its particular application to a given particular situa-
tion, may be likened to a discovery of the laws of nature as they
apply to other elements of nature.
If man, by his reasoning power, brings about a certain combi-
nation of physical circumstances, a reaction will occur which is
called the explosion of a thermo-nuclear device, and an entire
island will be destroyed. Thus mankind has discovered certain
laws of nature, applied them and observed the results. This does
not mean to say that every individual man is capable of knowing
all the rules which operate to culminate in this effect. A few men,
as individuals gifted in intellect and assiduous in study, have
analysed and labored mightily to uncover and understand these
laws. But they are understandable by the mind of man; this is the
all-important principle. The balance of humankind know that the
intellect is capable of understanding and applying these rules of
physical operation to the universe. They know that much because
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they can see an island disappear at the ordered command of he
who professes to comprehend. When confronted with this evidence
it is difficult to remain skeptical. Yet these conditions are the re-
sult, ultimately, of the reasoning power of the intellect of man.
Through this same power of the channel of reasoning we know
that there are certain rules of creation concerning men. Men are
born, exist and die. They are subject to certain physical laws as
described above. The relationship between a man and the other
physical features of creation is subject to inexorable laws and
rules of conduct. To a large extent, these physical laws govern the
relationships between men.
Similarly to the process of discovery whereby man has compre-
hended some of the laws of nature relating to the physical universes
as above set out, so too has he reasoned, studied and analyzed the
laws governing the relationships between men on an intellectual
plane. Some of the most highly developed intellects ever to be on
earth have worked at this problem. Their efforts have not been
barren, some of these laws have been discovered, and we have been
told what they are. Some of them have been written in the Ten
Commandments. Some of them are in the Alkoran of Mohammed.
Some are in the writings of the early Greek dramatists, St.
Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Jefferson and many other
men who knew some of the rules and stated them in more or less
accurate form.
In speaking generally of these rules, the use of vague terms
such as justice, law, right, equity, fraternity, liberty and equality
is a meaningless gesture unless specific details are in mind. So to
be specific I say this, that when a man is confronted with a situa-
tion or a condition in which he wants to know the truth as to
whether a certain proposed or existing action is just or unjust, he
must use the natural law, the law of God the Creator, a law
external to the propagating author of the particular action being
considered. Now all such queries, all such problems, are almost
unsolvable because of the complexity of facts and ideas and the
limits of language. However, a measurement can be made, a deci-
sion reached and action taken that will in all respects conform to the
natural law. But some of these rules and their operation must be
taken as true by the majority of men even though they are not un-
derstood or comprehended tecause the rules have been posited
and demonstrated by other men. If a physicist tells me that if such
and such is done an island will disappear. I believe him. just so, if a
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scholar of the natural law tells me that a certain proposed action
is violative of the natural law, and contrary to man's nature, I be-
lieve him.
This leads to a discussion relative to the problem of who is or
can become a scholar of the natural law. How is he recognized?
How is he to be tested? What are his materials? Where are his
tools ?
The answer lies in the definition of a philosopher. He must
first be a disinterested searcher for the truth. The pursuit of
knowledge must be his aim. He must be as steadfast to those two
principles as his erring nature will permit. His tools must be the
recorded observations of other men as to what events have taken
place, in a word, it is history. To all this he must apply his" reason-
ing power and arrive at a conclusion; then his conclusion must be
compared to the conclusions of other philosophers and an intel-
lectual evaluation must be made. But the dictates or rules of natural
law cannot be written down with the detail of a statute book, for
each application of the natural law must be separately considered.
Several writers have attempted to set down these rules, witness the
Decalogue, the Declaration of Independence and other familiar
writings. As Loevinger points out, under certain circumstances it
may be conformable to the natural law to commit homicide-yet
this action violates the literal language of the Ten Commandments.
Vhere then is the test? It is, to the ordinary human, the intel-
lectual integrity of the man who assumes the role of philosopher.
Each man must measure the source of his own moral convictions
with the yardsticks of the philosopher, and then act on his own
reasoned judgment that the idea is to be accepted or rejected.
As it seems that the real meat of the problem concerns the right
of rebellion if such there be, I first seek to find what has been said
about that right or fact. The first item that comes to attention
is the writing of the early Greek dramatists, Aesschylus, Sophocles
and Euripides. They all tell of the rebellion of Antigone against
the decree of the Idng that her brother Polyneices be left unburied
and his body desecrated by the birds and the wolves. Here in detail
is told the unfortunate consequences that befell the King Creon,
as a direct result of his insistence on the unnatural decree and the
resultant rebellion of Antigone. Sophocles, writing in the year
400 B.C. or thereabouts has recognized the existence of a law
outside the king or legislature in these words :
Cr: Now tell me thou-not in many words, but briefly-knewest
thou that an edict had forbidden this?
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An: I knew it: could I help it? It was public.
Cr: And thou didst indeed dare to transgress that law?
An: Yes; for it was not Zeus that had published me that edict;
not such are the laws set among men by the Justice who
dwells with the gods below; nor deemed I that thy
decrees were of such force, that a mortal could override
the unwritten and unfailing statutes of heaven. For their
life is not of today or yesterday, but from all time, and
no man knows when they were first put forth.
Not through dread of any human pride could I answer
to the gods for breaking these. Die I must-I knew that
well (how should I not?)--even without thy edicts. But
if I am to die before my time, I count that a gain: for
when any one lives, as I do, compassed about with evils,
can such a one find aught but gain in death?
So for me to meet this doom is trifling grief: but if I had
suffered my mother's son to lie in death an unburied
corpse, that would. have grieved me; for this, I am not
grieved. And if my present deeds are foolish in thy
sight, it may be that a foolish judge arraigns my folly."
The above reference to the ancient poets and their works will
at least show us that we are not considering a problem that is new
or one that has been given no attention by the millions that have
preceded us on this planet. No, Sophocles' work is now about 2,300
years old. The fact that it is still available testifies to the fact that
some men who lived between him and us have felt that what he
said was worth preserving. Here is the language that he used
when considering the existence of the justicestick. He knew the
measure of a thing cannot be itself, and if a thing or an idea is to
be measured, the measure must be standardized outside of the
measured item.
Plato relates a discussion between Crito and Socrates that took
place in the prison of Socrates just before his execution. The title
of the dialogue is Crito. Here Socrates refuses to leave his prison
and escape although the means is provided by Crito. The reasoning
of Socrates in his refusal seems to hold that one should obey the
law. He seems to remain in the prison only because of, and out of
respect to the laws of Athens. But a careful study of the writing
shows that the idea of Socrates is not that the law is in existence and
therefore.,should be obeyed, but rather it is a careful examination
into the basis for a decision as to whether the law should or should
not be obeyed under the particular circumstances in which the
decision was made. The emphasis is not on the assertion that the
law is to be obeyed or not, but rather on the problem of whether
to obey or not. Here is the language of Plato on the point:
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"Soc: From these premises I proceed to argue the question
whether I ought or ought not to try and escape without the
consent of the Athenians: and if I am clearly right in escaping,
then I will make the attempt; but if not, I will abstain. The
other considerations which you mention, of money and loss of
character and the duty of educating ones children, are, I fear,
only the doctrines of the multitude, who would be as ready to
restore people to life, if they were able, as they are to put them
to death-and with as little reason. But now, since the argu-
ment has thus far prevailed, the only question which remains
to be considered is, whether we shall do rightly either in escap-
ing or in suffering others to aid in our escape and paying them
in money and thanks, or whether in reality we shall not do
rightly; and if the latter, then death or any other calamity
which may ensue on my remaining here must not be allowed to
enter into the calculation."
From here then, Socrates proceeds to consider whether he
would be doing the right thing by attempting to escape, or whether
he should remain in the prison. The fact that it would be against
the law of Athens to escape was considered as a factor in the
reasoning, but it was not the deciding element. For a classic ex-
ample of the reasoning process to which I have referred, the pas-
sages following that quoted should be examined. Here is reason-
ing at its purest as it attempts to discover a particular application
of the natural law to a particular situation. To the skeptic who is
unable to see the light, who cannot see the principles of the natural
law, nor know how they are arrived at, who does not fathom the
ability of man to arrive at a decision in accordance with the prin-
ciples of natural law, the Crito provides an excellent example. The
fact that the ultimate decision reached was to obey the law is im-
material to the issue here involved. What is important is the fact
that Socrates saw fit to examine the basis of his action although
the law had commanded him to act.
For the testimony of another famous and learned scholar,
Aristotle, we turn to that phase of his effort which he named
Rhetoric. Here he tells of his concept of the just and the unjust
laws. He refers to the tale of Antigone, told before herein. He
affirms the stand taken by Antigone and tells specifically of the
value of the thought of Sophocles in the passage quoted above tell-
ing of the conversation between Creon and Antigone; her justi-
fication for refusing to comply with the law is explained and ac-
cepted as the correct and right thing to be done. So does Aristotle
approve the philosophy of Sophocles and the other Greeks named.
Aristotle refers again and again to natural justice; he refers to the
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unwritten law and to the written law. In his writings it seems in-
herent that he believes that there are such things as good laws and
bad laws, just laws and unjust laws; he is continually applying to
all law the measure of natural justice. In one place he compares
justice to silver, and calls upon the assayist to judge of its quality.
In other words, what is needed is the concept of the yardstick of
justice or the justicestick.
That the fire of rebellion burned in Rome during its days of
power and ascendancy is beyond question. There are two instances
in literature that come to attention especially. The first is in
Plutarch's life of Tiberius. Plutarch has Tiberius giving a speech
wherein he sets out the duty and the responsibility of the people to
depose a ruler when he becomes oppressive, and exceeds his
authority and the power given to him by the people that have ele-
vated him to the position that he holds. The language of Plutarch
is as follows:
"'A tribune,' he said, 'of the people, is sacred indeed, and
ought to be inviolable, because in a manner consecrated to be
the guardian and protector of them; but if he degenerate so far as
to oppress the people, abridge their powers, and take away their
liberty of voting, he stands deprived by his own act of honours
and immunities, by the neglect of the duty for which the honour
was bestowed upon him. Otherwise we should be under the
obligation to let a tribune do this pleasure, though he should
proceed to destroy the capitol or set fire to the arsenal. He who
should make these attempts would be a bad tribune. He who
assails the power of the people is no longer a tribune at all. Is
it not inconceivable that a tribune should have power to imprison
a consul, and the people have no authority to degrade him when
he uses that honor which lie received from them, to their detri-
ment ? For the tribunes, as well as the consuls, hold office by the
people's votes. . . . So likewise a Tribune retains not his in-
violability, which for the people's sake was accorded to him,
when he offends against the people, and attacks the foundations
of that authority from whence he derived his own. We esteem
him to be legally chosen tribune who is elected only by the
majority of votes; and is not therefore the same person much
more lawfully degraded when, by a general consent of them all,
they agree to depose him '"
So spoke Tiberius, according to Plutarch, and there is in those
words support for the position taken in this article. There is an
attempt to show that other men, men of the highest position in the
Roman Empire felt that authority of the government is not valid
simply because it is there. There is something that can be done by
bureaucrats or tribunes that is wrong and not conformable to the
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requirements of law. Here is language that means that if a govern-
ment official is not doing the right thing he miy and must be de-
posed. From whence Plutarch gets this idea, he does not say, but
Tiberius probably knew that he who gives may remove with equal
authority that which he has given. Now, the important thing to
notice about all this is not that the power to remove is there. That
the ultimate authority to rebel is held to be present, that people
have the right to rebel, according to Tiberius, is plain. But nowhere
does he define the standard he is using. Is a tribune bad because
of this act or that one? We must ask, what is the justicestick of
Tiberius?
The answer is oppression. There is a lack of authority to oppress
inherent in the power that is given to the people who are to exer-
cise the authority of government. It is not reasonable or conform-
able to the reasonable natural law for a people, or mankind in
general, to create a vehicle for their own oppression; and if this is
so, then a government created by the mind of man does not have
the jurisdiction to oppress the people who have created it. Later in
this article, it will be seen that reason is inherent in all of the
considerations of the power of governments and the bureaucrats
who run them.
A second great instance of rebellion is treated by Plutarch in
the life of Marcus Brutus. Here the historian tells of the rebellion
of Brutus and Antony in much the same language as might be used
by the modern press. There is not much comment about the justice
or the merits of either case, but the author tells how it took place,
who participated and what the results were. Here is the force of
rebellion apparently applied not because of any moral justification,
but rather because of the power desires of two contending factions
with no consideration given any thought but the power of the two
sides, both equally evil when measured against the common stand-
ards of the natural law. And yet here is rebellion. How will the
skeptics say which side is right? And why should Brutus and his
bloodthirsty crew have any moral preference over Caesar? The
problem seems insurmountable unless there is an ultimate, abso-
lute standard to which the conduct of both participants can be ap-
plied and measured. For if the standard is within the thing itself,
then there is no method of determining which side in the affray, if
either, was morally or legally correct and entitled to be obeyed
because lawfully in power and the rightful lawgiver. What could
the people of Rome do except apply the standard of the bayonet?
He who has the power is the one who will be obeyed. This is the
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ultimate standard of the skeptic, and it removes the distinction
between right and might. The argument is old, and here is an
opportunity to apply the test. Plutarch does not seem to decide
which was the correct side. He merely states the facts and leaves
the philosophizing to the reader.
The works of Plutarch are replete with examples of rebellion,
and the efforts of the reader will be rewarded by a perusal of the
histories even if the only idea extracted from them is the central
overpowering presence of the principle of violence in the lives of
the great men he biographies. In all cases the emphasis is on the
sword, blood and conspiracy. Whether this is Plutarch, or the
actualities of the times he portrays, the reader must judge; but
unquestionably, the blood is there. A study of Plutarch is a study
of the application to the field of government of the principle of
might at its purest. Does this mean that because it is, it is right?
With these provocative thoughts, we leave Plutarch.
The thought of refusal to serve in the army has been considered
by other men at other times. There is little new about the predic-
tion that refusal to serve in the army confronts the refuser with
trouble. The manner and method of conscription has caused con-
siderable comment by historians generally. Tacitus is a particular
example. In Book IV of his Histories he tells of rebellion because
of conscription in these words:
"... By command of Vitellius all the Batavian youth was
then being summoned to the conscription, a thing naturally
vexatious, and which the officials made yet more burdensome
by their rapacity and profligacy, while they selected aged and
infirm persons, whom they might discharge for a consideration,
and mere striplings, but of distinguished beauty (and many
attained even in boyhood to a noble stature), whom they
dragged off for infamous purposes. This caused indignation,
and the ringleaders of the concerted rebellion prevailed upon
the people to refuse the conscription. Civilis collected at one
of the sacred groves, ostensibly for a banquet, the chiefs of the
nation and the boldest spirits of the lower class. When he saw
them warmed with the festivities of the night, he began by
speaking of the renown and glory of their race, and then
counted the wrongs and oppressions which they endured, and
all the other evils of slavery. 'There is,' he said, 'no alliance, as
once there was; we are treated as slaves. When does even a
legate come amongst us, though he come only with a burden-
some retinue and in all the haughtiness of power? We are
handed over to prefects and centurions, and when they are
glutted with our spoils and our blood, then they are changed,
and new receptacles for plunder, new terms for spoilation, are
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discovered. Now the conscription is at hand, tearing, we may
say forever children from parents, and brothers from brothers.
Never has the power of Rome been more depressed. In the
winter quarters of the legions there is nothing but property
to plunder and a few old men. Only dare to look up, and cease
to tremble at the empty names of legions. For we have a vast
force of horse and foot; we have the Germans our kinsmen; we
have Gaul bent on the same objects. Even to the Roman people
this war will not be displeasing; if defeated, we shall still reckon
it a service to Vespasian, and for success no account need be
rendered.'"
And so a rebellion was born of the evils of oppression by the
legions. And yet the legions were there. The skeptics would stand
for, agree to and suffer oppression because they have no standard.
A reading of Tacitus leads to the query, "Is it according to the
belief of the skeptic that one is justified in rebellion if one's sons
are dragged off by the conscriptors to provide homosexuals with
satisfaction? And if so, why is it wrong, according to what stand-
ards do they say that this is not law ?" The power of the legion, and
the authority of Rome was demanding the action. There it was,
either suffer or rebel. There was no alternative, and under the cir-
cumstances the student of the natural law will have no difficulty
reaching a decision, for the practice of homosexuality is a perver-
sion of the faculties of reproduction given to man, and a use of
these functions that is contrary to the reasonable use of them.
Inasmuch as the use of the sexual faculties for homosexual pur-
poses is not in accord with reason and is supportable on no logical
grounds, but is rather an unreasonable and illogical use of the
body, the practice is contrary to the natural law and so contrary
to the law of God, and therefore any rule or force supporting the
practice is no law at all, but a nullity which cannot be obeyed by
anyone because no one is subject to it. Rebellion rises in the hearts
of men at such treatment as forced homosexuality under color of
the law; and if the skeptics do not feel it, they are academic in the
ultimate and not considering the practical effect of emotions upon
the application of law to man. Rebellion is inherent under such
laws and yet it is only justifiable if at all under a philosophy which
recognizes a law as valid only if conformable to some other ex-
ternal standard. Where is the standard of the skeptic? Where is
the standard of the skeptic if not in the bayonet and all that it
implies? The standard of the natural law is the reason of man.
Tacitus has been used to give this rather powerful example of
the causes of rebellion and to point up the necessity of a standard
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against which to measure the questions that confront a man when
faced with the issue of rebellion. For some of the philosophy be-
hind the problem, let us now look at the writings of St. Augustine.
This saintly writer, because he knew so much about the actions and
motivations of men, must be heard and listened to. On the problem
he spoke in Confessions saying:
"For any part which harmonizeth not with its whole is offen-
sive. But when God commands a thing to be done against the
customs or compact of any people, though it were never by
them done heretofore, it is to be done; and if intermitted, it is
to be restored; and if never ordained, is now to be ordained.
For lawful if it be for a king, in the state which he reigns over,
to command that which no one before him, or he himself here-
tofore, had commanded, and to obey him cannot be against the
commonweal of the state; (nay, it were against it if he were not
obeyed, for to obey princes is a general compact of human
society); how much more unhesitatingly ought we to obey
God, in all which He commands, the Ruler of all His creatures !
For, as among the powers in man's society the greater authority
is obeyed in preference to the lesser, so must God above all.
. . . Many an action then which in men's sight is disap-
proved is by Thy testimony approved; and many, by men
praised, are (Thou being witness) condemned: because the
shew of the action, and the mind of the doer, and the unknown
exigency of the period severally vary."
Also in the City of God, Augustine refers again and again to
the relationship existing betveen the earthly city, and The City of
God. Here he tells of the proper sphere of activity of each com-
munity. Here the entire tenor of the words is to the effect that the
two cities, the earthly and the heavenly city, are mutually using
the laws and customs of the early city so long as the two find it
necessary to exist side by side in the earthly area. But the laws,
philosophy, and attainments. of the earthly city are criticized and
the feeling is given out that while the two cities are mutually sup-
porting for the purpose of earthly peace, yet the laws of the earthly
city need not be obeyed in the city of God when those rules con-
flict with the law of God. Some of the pertinent language is as
follows:
"It has come to pass that the two cities could not have com-
mon laws of religion, and that the heavenly city has been com-
pelled in this matter to dissent, and to become obnoxious to those
who think differently, and to stand the brunt of their anger and
hatred and persecutions, except in so far as the minds of their
enemies have been alarmed by the multitude of the Christians
and quelled by the manifest protection of God accorded to
them."
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"Even the heavenly city, therefore, while in its state of
pilgrimage, avails itself of the peace of earth, and, so far as it
can without injuring faith and godliness, desires .and main-
tains a common agreement among men regarding the acquisi-
tion of the necessaries of life, and makes this earthly peace bear
upon the peace of heaveri; for this alone can be truly called and
esteemed the peace of the reasonable creatures, consisting as it
does in the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God
and of one another in God."
Thus, the language of the saint shows that there is a difference
between the city of God and the earthly city or the city of man.
There is a law that is above the laws, or so-called laws, of men.
For it is plain to the saint that if a rule or order or decree of the
earthly city conflicts with the law of God, it cannot be obeyed.
This is particularly true, he feels, in relation to laws concerning
religion.
The discussion has now progressed to a point where we can
with profit examine some of the writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas
to see what it is that man said that makes him the renowned leader
of the dogmatist school of philosophical thought in this field. It
would be presumptuous to attempt to paraphrase the writings of
the saint, and so I will cite verbatim from his work that part which
is directly in point:
"On the other hand laws may be unjust in two ways. First,
by being contrary to human good, through being opposed to
the things mentioned above: either in respect of the end, as
when an authority imposes on his subjects burdensome laws,
conducive not to the common good but rather to his own
cupidity or vainglory; or in respect of the author, as when a
man makes a law that goes beyond the power committed to
him; or in respect of the form, as when burdens are imposed
unequally on the community, although with a view to the
common good. The like are acts of violence rather than law,
because, as Augustine says,... a law that is not just seems to
be no law at all. Therefore such laws do not bind in conscience,
except perhaps in order to avoid scandal or disturbance, for
which cause a man should even yield his right....
"Secondly laws may be unjust through being opposed to
the Divine good. Such are the laws of tyrants inducing to
idolatry, or to any thing else contrary to the Divine law;
and laws of this kind must in no way be observed, because as
stated in Acts ... we ought to obey God rather than nen." 13
It is in this passage just quoted that the truth is put unassail-
ably. The natural law is the measuring stick. Here is the soul of
the issue. Is a whole equal to the sum of its parts, or is it possible,
13. Id. atQ. 96, Art. 4. .
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logically for a part to be greater than the whole of which it is a
lart. Cold, cAlculating logic requires that the law be held to be a
lesser creature than the man who has made it. But more of this
after we search some more of the available authority on the mat-
ter. However, before leaving the great philosopher and leader of the
natural law concept, there is one other statement that he made to
which we must refer. This is where he states:
"A tyrannical government is not just, because it is directed,
not to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler,
as the Philosopher states. Consequently there is no sedition in
disturbing a government of this kind, unless indeed the tyrant's
rule be disturbed so inordinately that his subjects suffer greater
harm from the consequent disturbance than from the tyrant's
government. Indeed it is the tyrant rather that is guilty of sedi-
tion, since he encourages discord and sedition among his sub-
jects, that he may lord over them more securely; for this is
tyranny, since it is ordered to the private good of the ruler and
to the injury of the multitude."
The similarity of thought contained in this quotation and that
expressed in the Declaration of Independence should be noted.
With this not so strange comparison, we can leave St. Thomas
and look to the philosophy of a man who had a somewhat different
attitude toward the relationship between government and the gov-
erned. This is Hobbes. Now Hobbes is no friend or advocate of
the authoritarian dogmatic school, but he had things to say in
regard to the matter under discussion here that appear worthy of
note. It seems to the writer that the basic premise for most of the
language of Hobbes on the subject is contained in Leviathan,
where he states,
"Thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voice
declared a sovereign, he that dissented must now consent with
the rest; that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do,
or else justly be destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily
entered into the congregation of them that were assembled, he
sufficiently declared thereby his will, and therefore tacitly cov-
enanted, to stand to what the major part should ordain: and
therefor if he refuse to stand thereto, or make protestation
against any of their decrees, he does contrary to his covenant,
and therefore unjustly."'14
The language that follows this passage is a logical followup of
the premise, and it is carried to its development in the following
words,
"For it has been already shown that nothing the sovereign
representative can do to a subject, on what pretence soever, can
14. Leviathan, Part II, Chap. 18.
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properly be called injustice or injury; because every subject
is author of every act the sovereign "doth, so that he never
wanteth right to any thing, otherwise than as he himself is the
subject of God, and bound thereby to observe the laws of
nature."';
The next step in the reasoning of Hobbes along the line we
pursue, is that the things that a man cannot divest himself of by
covenant remain in him, and the sovereign is powerless to require
action in accordance with the rights retained or contrary to the
rights not covenanted to the state. This is spelled out in the brief
passage which reads,
"If the sovereign command a man, though justly condemned,
to kill, wound, or maim himself; or not to resist those that
assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, air, medicine, or
any other thing without which he cannot live; yet hath that man
the liberty to disobey."'"
To continue our search into the wellsprings of rebellion, we turn
to John Locke, a writer who gave considerable thought to the
foundations of government. In a treatise entitled Concerning Civil
Government he has examined the right of rebellion in these words,
"It may be demanded here, what if the executive power,
being possessed of the force of the commonwealth, shall make
use of that force to hinder the meeting and acting of the legis-
lative, when the original constitution or the public exigencies
require it? I say, using force upon the people, without authority,
and contrary to the trust put in him that does so is a state of
war with the people, who have a right to reinstate their legisla-
tive in the exercise of their power. For having erected a legisla-
tive with an intent they should exercise the power of making
laws, either at certain set times, or when there is need of it,
when they are hindered by any force from what is so necessary
to the society and wherein the safety and preservation of the
people consists, the people have a right to remove it by force.
In all states and conditions the true remedy of force without
authority is to oppose force to it. The use of force without
authority always puts him that uses it into a state of war as the
aggressor, and renders him liable to be treated accordingly."'11
And again, at a later time in the same work, Locke gives an
answer to the question which is raised throughout this article,
namely, who is to be judged.
Locke's answer is this,
" the common question will be made'; Who shall be
judge whether the prince or legislative act contrary to their
trust? This, perhaps, ill-affected and factious men may spread
15. Id. at Chap. 21.
16. Ibid.
17. Locke, Concerning Civil Government, Chap. XIII, Par. 155.
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amongst the people, whea the prince only makes use of his due
prerogative. To this I reply, The people shall be judge; for two
shall be judge whether his trustee or deputy acts well and
according to the trust reposed in him, but he who deputes him
and must, by having deputed him, have still a power to discard
him when he fails in his trust? If this be reasonable in particu-
lar cases of private men, why should it be otherwise in that of
the greatest moment, where the welfare of millions is concerned
and also where the evil, if not prevented, is greater, and the re-
dress very difficult, dear, and dangerous?
• "But, farther, this question, who shall be judge, cannot mean
that there is no judge at all. For where there is no judicature on
earth to decide controversies amongst men, God in heaven is
judge. He alone, it is true, is judge of the right. But every man
is judge for himself, as in all other cases so in this, whether an-
other hath put himself into a state of war with him, and whether
he should appeal to the supreme jurge, as Jephtha did."' ",
And so along with the eminent Locke, the skeptics cry out,
"Who is to be judge?"
But unlike that esteemed gentleman the skeptics have no an-
swer. They are unable to see the light save from within the frame-
work of the bulb. This is again at the heart of the problem. Who
is to be the judge? Where is the justicestick? Hobbes was certainly
mistaken in many of his ideas; however, he was not confused as to
the measuring stick to be applied, or rather he knew that there was
such a tool which could be used.
The precurser, the John of the modern skeptics, 0. W. Holmes,
was a philosopher who advocated the theory of force, and it has
been followed by most of the skeptics. By this it is meant that they
have believed that law was the application of the force of the
community to the arguments between members of that community;
there was no such thing as having the force applied rightly or
wrongly; there was only the factual concept of the application, and
this application was independent of the concept of right or wrong.
Or rather, carried to its logical conclusion it was that the applica-
tion of force was always right; and he who caused it to be applied
in his favor was in the right because he had the force of the com-
munity on his side. This is the idea that might is right, at least
until it is overcome by a mightier power. This is the belief that for
the weaker to say he is right is a meaningless gibberish because the
stronger has the physical power to bend the weaker to his will;
and this is the fact-that the strong are able to act, and the weak
are not; therefore the right: is always with the might. There have
18. Id. at Chap. XIX, Par. 240.
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been other thinkers who have seriously examined this problem,
and one of them has written his thoughts for our contemplation.
He was Jean Rousseau,
"3. The right of the strongest.
"The strongest is never strong enough to be always the
master, unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience
into duty. Hence the right of the strongest, which, though to all
seeming meant ironically, is really laid down as a fundamental
principle. But are we never to have an explanation of this
phrase? Force is a physical power, and I fail to see what moral
effect it can have. To yield to force is an act of necessity, not
of will-at the most, an act of prudence. In what sense can it
be a duty?
"Suppose for a moment that this so-called 'right' exists. I
maintain that the sole result is a mass of inexplicable nonsense.
For, if force creates right, the effect changes with the cause:
every force that is greater than the first succeeds to its right.
As soon as it is possible to disobey with impunity, disobedience
is legitimate; and, the strongest being always in the right, the
only thing that matters is to act so as to become the strongest.
But what kind of right is that which perishes when force fails?
If we must obey perforce, there is no need to obey because we
ought; and if we are not forced to obey, we are under no obli-
gation to do so. Clearly, the word 'right' adds nothing to force:
in this connection, it means absolutely nothing.
"Obey the powers that be. If this means yield to force, it is
a good precept, but superflous: I can answer for its never being
violated. All power comes from God, I admit; but so does all
sickness: does that mean that we are forbidden to call in the
doctor? A brigand surprises me at the edge of a wood: must
I not merely surrender my purse on compulsion: but, even if
I could withhold it, am I in conscience bound to give it up?
For certainly the pistol he holds is also a power.
"Let us then admit that force does not create right, and that
we are obliged to obey only legitimate powers." 19
One need add but little to this quote to get it in line with the
present tenor of thought. If force is right, then the only wrong in
crimes of violence is the fact that the force of the state is stronger
than the criminal, and will be brought to bear against him as an
individual. As between the criminal and his victim, the criminal is
in the right just so long as the force of the state is not being ap-
plied to his person, but as soon as the force of the state, in person
of the police, is brought up on the side of the victim, then, and only
in that event, is the right changed to the side of the victim. And to
go on, the force of the state as applied to individuals within the
19. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book I, Par. 3.
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state is in the right just so long as the force of the state is supreme,
but when the force of the state is subordinated to another force,
such as a conquering hostile power, then the force of the state is
not stronger and so the right passes to the conqueror. This means
that right is not a concept separate from force, but it is a synonym.
It is against this concept that Rousseau wrote in the cited passage,
and against which I now write. However, this philosophy of force
means that if a man would strive for the right, he must, as Jean
said 200 years ago, only strive to be stronger. This is the goal of
much of the world today. They believe basically that to be strong
is to be right and so they attempt to be strong. It is this philosophy
that has led to warfare, killing, bloodletting, bombardment and
the almost ceaseless attempt to outgun the others. It lies at the
foundations of Russian Communism. It is the main actuating,
fundamental principle of the government of Russia, China, most
of the Balkans, and all of the puppet countries behind the so-called
iron curtain. It has its roots deep in the history of the German
people, and its resurgence is bound to come again if given leeway
in Germany. It is against this philosophy that the free world must
argue if it is to survive, for we who are still free must recognize
the forces that are arrayed against us or we will perish. These
forces are those that were advocated by Holmes and the skeptics.
They can be countered only by those who follow the rebellious of
the world who have revolted because they knew there was a right
separate from power.
To return to research, Immanuel Kant, who wrote about the
science of right, had this to say about the question asked by Locke
as to who would be judge,
"Who is to be the judge in a controversy between the people
and the sovereign? For the people and the sovereign are to be
constitutionally or juridically regarded as two different moral
persons: but the question shows that the people would then
have to be the judge in their own cause."
Here Kant denies that there is any right in the people to rebel
against the sovereign power. He does not discuss the oppressive
possibilities of a sovereign, but the language leads one to believe
that Kant knows of no reason that would allow rebellion.
The rebels of the world look to the American revolt from the
English for their guidance and leadership on a moral and intellec-
tual as well as an emotional plane. Here is some of the world's
great literature on rebellion. The lights of the period were Madison,
Hamilton and Jay. The papers that they wrote are the world's
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bible of Federalism, and they are rightly named The Federalist.
Some of the pertinent quotations are these:
From Number 33:
"But it is said that the laws of the Union are to be the
supreme law of the land. But what inference can be drawn from
this, or what would they amount to, if they were not to be
supreme? It is evident they would amount to nothing. A Law,
by the very meaning of the term, includes supremacy. It is a
rule which those to whom it is prescribed are bound to ob-
serve. This results from every political association. If indi-
viduals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society
must be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number
of political societies enter into a larger political society, the
laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers in-
trusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme
over those societies, and the individuals of whom they are com-
posed .... But it will not follow from this doctrine that acts of
the larger society which are not pursuant to its constitutional
powers, but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of
the smaller societies, will become the supreme law of the land.
These will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be
treated as such."
From Number 78:
"There is no position which depends on clearer principles
than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the
tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void.
No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the constitution can
be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is
greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master;
that the representatives of the people are superior to the people
themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only
what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid."
These men were guided by the ringing pronouncement of
Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence,
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that al men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain analienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness."
These words mean just what they say. They are more than
mere egalitarian folderol. They are the essence of a philosophy
of rebellion against materialistic skepticism, and the belief that
might makes right that is fostered by the skeptics. These rights are
above an application of force that may he applied by any earthly
government or power. These rights exist in each individual inde-
pendent of any physical force, and may not be removed from an
individual by the use of force. They may be modified, changed or
limited or even removed completely under certain circumstances
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compatable with the principles of natural law; but they may not be
altered one iota by the bare application of power, all else remaining
constant. The application or non-application of force to the indi-
vidual is absolutely immaterial to the existence of the rights which
were called rights by the writers of the Declaration cited above.
That document is the ringing cry of rebellion at its finest, and its
signers are rebels enshrined forever in the minds and memories
of the dogmatists. With such inspiration we cannot help but
triumph over the forces of materialistic power, and to the task we
again reconsecrate "our lives, our fortunes and our sacred honor."
Expediency is the justicestick of the skeptic, the force philos-
opher, and the materialistic communist atheists. That this idea did
not originate recently is apparent from an examination of the
writing of another great author of the past, John Stuart Mill. He
commented on the problem in Utilitarianism in these words,
"Secondly, the legal rights of which he is deprived, may be
rights which ought not to have belonged to him; in other
words, the law which confers on him these rights, may be a
bad law. When it is so, or when (which is the same thing for
our purpose) it is supposed to be so, opinions will differ as to
the justice or injustice or infringing it. Some maintain that no
law, however bad, ought to be disobeyed by an individual citi-
zen; that his opposition to do it, if shown at all, should only be
shown in endeavouring to get it altered by competent authority.
This opinion (which condemns many of the most illustrious
benefactors of mankind, and would often protect pernicious in-
stitutions against the only weapons which, in the state of things
existing at the time, have any chance of succeeding against
them) is defended, by those who hold it, on grounds of ex-
pediency; principally on that of the importance, to the com-
mon interest of mankind, of maintaining inviolate the sentiment
of submission to law. Other persons, again, hold the directly
contrary opinion, that any law, judged to be bad, may blame-
lessly be disobeyed, even though it be not judged to be unjust,
but only inexpedient; while others would confine the license of
disobedience to the case of unjust laws: but again, some say,
that all laws which are inexpedient are unjust; since every law
imposes some restriction on the natural liberty of mankind,
which restriction is an injustice, unless legitimated by tending
to their good. Among these diversities of opinion, it seems to he
universally admitted that there may be unjust laws, and that
law, consequently, is not the ultimate criterion of justice, but
may give to one person a benefit, or impose on another an evil,
which justice condemns. When, however, a law is thought to be
unjust, it seems always to be regarded as being so in the same
way in which a breach of law is unjust, namely, by infringing
somebody's right; which, as it cannot in this case be a legal
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right, receives a different appellation, and is called a moral
right. We may say, therefore, that a second case of injustice
consists in taking or withholding from any person that to
which he has a moral right."
So we see that "expedience" is not something new, untried
and now presented for the first time. What makes it frightful at
this time is the fact that one-third of the world's people have a
government that adheres to the basic tenet of the philosophy; and
this will undoubtedly lead to the unhappiness of the people so sub-
jected as well as to that of all minkind. Anguish and bloodshed is
the lot of those who believe in the power of the sword.
All of the passages and quotations cited in the preceding pages
of this article are indicative of a universally-felt concept that there
is, as to every idea, something that is larger than the idea itself.
By this is meant that there runs a current through all of the major
works on the subject which indicates the universal truth that there
is and has to be a test or measurement that is possible for any idea.
There is no concept, no idea, no feeling that can stand by itself and
say that it is its own measure. For the only thing that can logically
adopt such a position is a being which contains all of the attributes
that we assign to God.
There is a generally accepted axiom of geometry to the effect
that the whole is greater than any of its parts. The axiom may be
restated to read that any part of creation is contained in the creator,
or that the creator must be larger than the created. The truth of
this statement is not open to any serious question. If it is accepted
as a premise, then the reasoning may be had that the state is a con-
cept that has its origin, its inception, or its formation from the
intellect of man. This means that the state, as an idea, is part of
the product of the mind of man. Thus, our reason can arrive at a
logical conclusion that the state, as an idea, is inferior to the mind
or the intellect of man its creator. The idea or thought that the
state is superior to an individual fails to recognize that inherent
in every man is the idea of intellect which gave rise to the idea of
state, and that to subordinate the individual to the state is to elevate
the created over a being which is equal to the creator and possesses
the same potential attributes. This is a logically unsound proposi-
tion if the premise assumed first above is true. Herein is where the
skeptics fail, for they do not see that the state and the ideas that
follow from the concept of state, such as statutes, ordinances, legis-
latures, courts, and administrative bodies, are all concepts inferior
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to that of intellect. Intellect is contained, in fact is found in, no
other place than in the mind of an individual man.
Herein lies the story of the basis for the disagreement between
dogmatism and skepticism. The dogmatist of the natural law recog-
nizes that the intellect and reasoning power of man, having gen-
erated the concept of state, are not limited thereby; are not con-
fined by an idea that it produced, but that the intellect is capable
of giving rise to other concepts which are greater than that of state
and which can, do and must regulate state. These larger concepts
are the natural law principles which are applied by man when he is
confronted with a situation which seems to place the state over the
individual.
The pyramid of jurisdiction which must be envisioned in order
to appreciate this reasoning is as follows: the statutes, laws, ordi-
nances, administrative rules and other promulgations of a civil state
derive their standing, moral authority, validity or enforceability
from the promulgating group, the legislature or judiciary or ad-
ministrative body; these bodies derive authority from the people
of the state as an organized group, the people acting as an entity
that is; and the people acting as an entity derive their authority
and jurisdiction from the individuals who comprise the group. The
individual derives his authority to speak in a group from that
which gave him the power or quality of existence, and this is his
Creator. This chain of jurisdictional power, as reasoned out, seems
unassailable from a logical or from an historical viewpoint. Thus
are expressed the many steps or positions that are passed over in
many discussions. A failure to admit the existence of any one of
them will lead to a gap in the logic which cannot be filled by any
other concept.
For instance, if we omit the Creator from this group and admit
all else, then we have the position that the ultimate authority
springs from the individual, and insofar as he is the fofit of all
authority, it is logically sound to state that he can be subject to
no guidance, authority, rules, sanctions, or other control or judg-
ment beyond that imposed by self. Certainly he can create nothing
which is superior to himself. This is the position of the anarchist:
nothing can, should or will regulate the individual insofar as he
does not desire regulation. All laws are suggestions, and can have
no moral binding force.
If the people as individuals are omitted, we have a chain wherein
the people as a body, as a group concept, have their authority de-
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rived directly from God. If the people as a group have their author-
ity derived directly from God, can the number of people who have
been given the authority have any bearing on the amount of
authority given? If the authority were given only if the totality of
mankind participated, it would fail, and God does not fail of His
purpose. If the idea of jurisdiction running from God to the people
as a group is valid, then the number of men in the group can have
no bearing on the amount of power given. If this is so, then the
power of the group must spring from the power given to the indi-
viduals in the group, for an individual is entitled to the same
amount of power as is given to the group.
The next possibility in the chain is that the power or jurisdiction
runs from God directly to the person of the ruler concept of state.
This is the divine ight of kings, and is a theory which has been
alleged and tried but found wanting. It is illogical in the premise
that a single man or a single family through the right of heredity
has the power to govern other men with or without their consent.
This principle led to the American Revolution and to the French
Revolution. It does not measure up to the requirements of a valid
assignment of authority in that the power given is considered to be
assigned to a creature not of the assignor's creation. The state as a
concept was the idea of man and all of its attributes have been
given to it by man. To say that God has given the state, a creature
of man, the power to rule over its creator and has removed from
man the power to change the attributes of the state which He has
created is to place man on the same plane as God or to reduce God
to the same plane as man. This has been tried with the never-failing
conclusion that the end of the attempt is war, rebellion and ruin for
the persons who claim the rights inherent in such a philosophy.
The state has only the attributes placed upon the concept by the
creator of the idea; and in the case of the state the creator is man.
The power of the state springs directly from man. Ultimately, as
set out above, the power of all government comes from God.
So as a result of this analysis, the moral compulsion on a man
to obey a law springs from the premise that the jurisdiction to
enact the law follows the chain outlined above. If for any reason,
the chain is broken; if the proper action is lacking in any of the
steps, then the moral compulsion to obey is lacking, the pronounce-
ment being considered is no law, is a nullity, and need not be
obeyed; rather it must not be obeyed, for to do so is to undermine
the power and jurisdiction of the valid lawgiver. So if a purported
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law is not enacted by the rightful government deriving its power
from the governed, then it is no law and need not be obeyed. So
also if a purported act of a vaidly constituted government is con-
trary to the ordered and controlled law of God, the natural law,
we have a conflict in the will of the ultimate authority, and this is
an impossible situation which can only be resolved in favor of the
underlying principles of the natural law as opposed to a particular
enactment of a state. Thus, a law which is in conflict with the
natural law cannot exist, and anything which purports to be law,
and at the same time is contrary to the natural law is a nullity and
not law, and must be disobeyed. Obedience to any such enactment
is giving precedence to a derived power over the direct and in-
herent power. It places the creature over the creator and violates
the premise that the whole is greater than any of its parts.
To restate the application of the natural law, it is this: the tenets
of the natural law cannot be written down anywhere for as soon
as the law is written it becomes positive law, and natural law is
not and cannot be made positive. The human being applying the
natural law must first assemble all the facts that can be assembled
by his finite and limited mind, and to these he must apply all of the
logic and reasoning power at his command together with all the
learning he can assimilate; then as a logical, reasoned result he will
come forth with a logically and reasonably supportable conclusion
that this particular application or action is or is not in conformance
with the natural law. This decision will not be logically assailable
-it will stand any and every test applied to it by the mind, because
it is conformable to nature and the laws of God which have been
implanted in the mind of man as a part of his creation. Such is the
fundamental nature of the natural law, and it is a law that will
continue to hold to its colors all men who are truly interested in
the application of learning to law. Such men will continue to im-
prove the state and its subordinate concepts. Such men will or-
ganize and develop a better place in which to live. Such men will
continue to plan, organize and work for a state that is closer to
the principles of God and nearer to realizing the ideal which is a
state in which all laws and all enforcement is conformable to the
principles of the natural law. Considering the frail nature of man,
and his overwhelming propensity to error, the organized dog-
matists have continued to improve the relationships between men
and their governments at a rate which is truly astounding. True it
is that the wars, killings, crime, greed and avarice of humanity at
times seem to be as overcoming as a suffocating cloud of poison
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gas, but that is the tale of the perennial prophets of doom. A cold
and careful analysis of the progress that has been made on earth
just during the time of recorded history is enough to give en-
couragement to the darkest prophet. The improvements can be
read in history, and in the never-ending day to day struggle to con-
tinue the march toward individual political liberty. Freedom from
the great fears of mankind is gradually being achieved by the or-
ganized efforts of dogmatists. The organized skeptics have no be-
lief in anything. As Loevinger has stated, organized skeptics have
burned no heretics, but neither have organized skeptics done any-
thing else. Organized skeptics have built no cathedrals, they have
settled no colonies, established no schools, plowed no new land,
defended no ideals with their lives and their blood, they have done
nothing to further the lot or station of man. No, organized skeptics
have done none of these things, but they have conceived, advo-
cated and upheld a philosophy which supports genocide as a valid
relationship between government and governed.
Through the skeptics, we have and will accomplish nothing save
reaction, retrogression and degeneration to the slavery of our an-
cestors, to the jails of Dicken's, the famine of the world, both as
to food and ideas. The skeptics merely shrug their shoulders when
they hear the words of the poet Markham,
"Is this the thing the Lord God made and gave
To have Dominion over land and ocean?"
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